



## STATE OF WISCONSIN Division of Hearings and Appeals

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In the Matter of

Office of the Inspector General, Petitioner

vs.

DECISION

Case #: FOF - 159910

██████████ Respondent

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The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

There appeared at that time the following persons:

**PARTIES IN INTEREST:**

Petitioner:

Office of the Inspector General  
Department of Health Services - OIG  
PO Box 309  
Madison, WI 53701

Respondent:

██████████  
██████████  
██████████

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:**

Corinne Balter  
Division of Hearings and Appeals

### **FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. The respondent (CARES # ██████████) is a resident of Walworth County who received FS benefits in Walworth County from July 1, 2012 through December 31, 2013.
2. On September 12, 2014, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that the respondent provided false information in order to receive FS benefits she was ineligible to receive.
3. The respondent lived in Louisiana when she received FS benefits from Wisconsin. Because she was not a resident of Wisconsin, she was not eligible to receive FS from Wisconsin.

4. The respondent failed to appear for the scheduled October 14, 2014 Intentional Program Violation (IPV) hearing and did not provide any good cause for said failure to appear.

### DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts;  
or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

*FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1; *see also* 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4) provides that the hearing shall proceed if the respondent cannot be located or fails to appear without good cause. The respondent did not appear or claim a good cause reason for not attending the hearing. Therefore, I must determine whether the respondent committed an IPV based solely on the evidence that the petitioner presented at hearing.

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. ...

*Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

*Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205* is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that “yes” should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. “Reasonable certainty” means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of

proof. This burden of proof is known as the “middle burden.” The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that “it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable.” 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1992). Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence, a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. See, *John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

In this case the issue is whether the respondent resided in Wisconsin or Louisiana. There is no question that her son who she reported was a household member was attending school in Louisiana. The respondent admitted that she had lied about her son living with her and that he was in fact a student in Louisiana. During the respondent’s conversations with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), she maintained that she lived in Wisconsin during this time period. I do not find that credible based upon the evidence presented by OIG. OIG showed several newspaper articles where this respondent was identified as the secretary of the French Market Vendors Association. The respondent also wrote a letter regarding a zoning proposing in New Orleans. She signed her name to that letter and wrote New Orleans underneath her name indicating she was from New Orleans. The respondent volunteered with the [REDACTED] of New Orleans. Her FS usage was almost entirely in Louisiana with the exception of short periods of time when she visited Wisconsin for a doctor appointment or other reason.

The respondent states that she gave her card to her son to use in Louisiana. However, this statement is not credible when one looks at the number of times the respondent identifies herself as a New Orleans resident. The respondent’s best argument is that she paid rent for a Wisconsin apartment during this time period. The agency requested her bank information to see that she was residing in Wisconsin and not New Orleans, but she failed to provide that, and failed to appear at the hearing.

The respondent admits that she lied about her son living with her and states that she gave her FS card to him so that he could purchase food in Louisiana. This alone is enough to show that there was an IPV, and to disqualify the respondent for one year.

Based upon the record before me, I find that the petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent intentionally violated FS program rules, and that this violation was the first such violation committed by the respondent. Therefore, the petitioner correctly seeks to disqualify the respondent from the FS program for one year.

### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. The respondent violated, and intended to violate, the FS program rule specifying that she not intentionally make a false or misleading statement.
2. The violation specified in Conclusion of Law No. 1 is the first such violation committed by the respondent.

**NOW, THEREFORE**, it is

**ORDERED**

That the petitioner's determination is sustained, and that the petitioner may make a finding that the respondent committed a first IPV of the FoodShare program and disqualify the respondent from the program for one year, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

**REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR**

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

**APPEAL TO COURT**

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST" **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).


The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Milwaukee,  
Wisconsin, this 24th day of October, 2014

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\sCorinne Balter  
Administrative Law Judge  
Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Office of the Inspector General - email  
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email  
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email  
Megan Ryan - email



## **State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**

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The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on October 24, 2014.

Office of the Inspector General  
Public Assistance Collection Unit  
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability  
[megan.ryan@wisconsin.gov](mailto:megan.ryan@wisconsin.gov)